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"With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief it is entirely
clear from our Nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause per-
mits th[e] disregard ofpolytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as
it permits the disregard of devout atheists."
Justice Antonin Scaliat
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PERMISSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT?
In the recent Decalogue Cases,' Justice Scalia conceded that govern-
ment cannot invoke the blessings of "God," or even say his name, "without con-
tradicting the beliefs of some people that there are many gods, or that God or the
gods pay no attention to human affairs." 2 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia declares
that this contradiction is of no constitutional moment, because the historical
understanding of the Establishment Clause permits government wholly to ignore
those who do not subscribe to monotheism. 3 Noting that more than 97% of
American believers are either Christians, Jews, or Muslims, Justice Scalia con-
cludes that government invocation or endorsement of belief in a monotheistic
God does not violate the Establishment Clause.4
Justice Scalia's opinion represents the latest effort to insulate American
civil religion from Establishment Clause attack. A "civil religion" is a set of
nondenominational values, symbols, rituals, and assumptions by means of
which a country interprets its secular history.5 Civil religion aims to bind citi-
I McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005). Van Orden and McCreary County were handed down less than two years after the Court
denied review in a divisive, high-profile case involving placement of a decalogue monument in
the Alabama state courthouse by then-Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore. See Moore v. Glass-
roth, 335 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003); see also Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating for lack of a secular purpose state-mandated posting of Ten
Commandments in public schools with notice advising that Commandments are the foundation of
contemporary western and American law).
2 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 Id Surely one of the most remarkable judicial declarations in contemporary Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, this statement confirms, as Professor Gey has put it, that Justice Scalia is
willing to say out loud what most judges dare only to think.
4 Id.
5 See ROBERT BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF TRIAL
3 (1975).
The concept of a "civil religion" was first employed by Rousseau, to refer to a set of purportedly
universal religious beliefs that government was obligated to encourage to ensure social stability.
See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk.4, ch.8, at 130 (Roger D. Masters ed.,
Judith R. Masters trans., New York, St. Martin's, 1978) (1762) ("There is ... a purely civil pro-
fession of faith, the articles of which are for the sovereign to establish, not exactly as religious
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zens to their nation and government with widely shared religious beliefs,
thereby supplying a spiritual interpretation of national history that suffuses it
with transcendent meaning and purpose.6
Since the founding era, successive versions of civil religion have framed
loyalty to the United States as a religious commitment as well as a purely civic
one.7 American civil religion thus filled the role played by the Anglican estab-
lishment in England, ascribing theological or spiritual meaning to the events of
America's founding and history, and thereby encouraging the social and politi-
cal cohesion thought necessary for the effective functioning of republican gov-
ernment.8
The most recent incarnation of American civil religion is the "Judeo-
Christian tradition," which emerged in the 1950s as a set of broad, even superfi-
cial, "spiritual" values that was thought to be held by virtually all Americans. 9
Its originally vacuous content was captured by President Eisenhower's famously
awkward observation that American government "makes no sense, unless it is
founded in a deeply felt religious faith-and I don't care what it is."' As Will
Herberg perceptively observed, Judeo-Christianity was less about the substance
of religious belief than about believing in religious belief."
Like President Eisenhower, Justice Scalia seems unaware that even the
theologically thin tradition of Judeo-Christianity no longer captures the breadth
of religious belief among all or nearly all Americans, if it ever did.' 2 Dramatic
dogmas, but as sentiments of sociability without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a
faithful subject."); see also id. at 127-28.
[The religion of the citizen], inscribed in a single country, gives it its Gods, its
own tutelary patrons. Its dogma, rites, and external cult are prescribed by
laws. Outside the single nation that observes it, everything is considered infi-
del, foreign, barbarous; it only extends the duties and rights of man as far as
its altars.
Id.
6 Yehudah Mirsky, Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237,
1250 (1986); Michael Walzer, Drawing the Line: Religion and Politics, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 619,
621 (1999).
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 17-33.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 34-56.
10 WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW 97 (1956) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gen.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address at Freedoms Foundation Director's Meeting (Dec. 22, 1952),
reported in President-Elect Says Soviet Demoted Zhukov Because of Their Friendship, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1952, at 1).
I Id. at 98 (arguing that American religion is not devoted to "God," but to "religion": "The
faith is not in God but in faith; we worship not God but our own worshiping."); see also NOAH
FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 165 (2005) ("Americans of the 1950s developed a public language for
speaking about religion in which they emphasized the importance of belonging to a church with-
out specifying the beliefs that membership might entail.").
12 See infra Part III.
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increases in unbelievers, practitioners of non-Western religions, and adherents
to postmodern spirituality now leave large numbers of Americans outside the
boundaries of Judeo-Christianity. These demographic changes thus prevent
Judeo-Christianity from performing the politically and socially unifying func-
tion of civil religion.
At the same time that religious demographic trends have expanded
American religious diversity beyond the boundaries of Judeo-Christianity, po-
litical forces are contracting these same boundaries. 13 Christian conservatives
do not understand Judeo-Christianity as an inclusive manifestation of the reli-
gious beliefs of nearly all contemporary Americans, but rather as the historic
and theologically exclusive faith of conservative Christianity. Consequently,
the symbols and observances of Judeo-Christianity now signify the thicker sec-
tarian meaning of this narrower religious interpretation of American history, and
not the thin religiosity of civil religion.' 4 Although it is precisely the sectarian
meaning of Judeo-Christian symbols and observances that motivates conserva-
tive Christians to defend their use by government, they ironically (if not cyni-
cally) rely on the historically thin religiosity of Judeo-Christianity to circumvent
Establishment Clause limitations on such use. This "sectarianization" of Judeo-
Christianity excludes too many Americans for it to function as a unifying civil
religion. "Sectarianization" also undermines the ethic of religious equality that
now informs Establishment Clause jurisprudence, threatening a regression into
classic tolerance, under which government would be constitutionally free to use
the symbols and observances of a purportedly inclusive Judeo-Christian civil
religion to promote conformity to a sectarian Christianity, so long as it protected
the basic rights of unbelievers and adherents to other religious faiths.
The insistence of conservative Christians on retaining Judeo-
Christianity as the American civil religion creates social and political division,
not unity. It has been the progressive separation of governmental machinery
from thick conceptions of the good that has permitted liberal democracy to func-
tion in the United States despite radically different religious beliefs that exist
among its citizens.' 5 Dramatically increasing religious pluralism in the United
States, combined with the "sectarianization" of Judeo-Christianity, make it dou-
bly unlikely that Judeo-Christianity or any civil religion can now function as a
political and social unifier. Insistence on a democracy informed by Judeo-
13 See infra Part IV.
14 Throughout this Essay, we use "sectarian" to signify theological narrowness, exclusion, and
self-absorption, and "nonsectarian" to signify the opposite-theological inclusion, ecumenicism,
and openness. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment "under God"? The Nonsectarian
Principle, 50 VILL. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (2005).
15 Throughout this Essay, we use "thick" in contrast to Rawls's "thin" theory of the good,
which holds that contemporary liberal democratic societies should generally avoid imposing
"thick" or substantive conceptions of the good on their members, in favor of "thin" or procedural
conceptions that limit their protections to individual autonomy and do not presuppose any good
beyond preservation of individual choice in a manner consistent with the rights of others. See
infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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Christianity is thus precisely the wrong answer to the question of religious dif-
ference in the contemporary United States. 16
II. VARIETIES OF AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
A. The Established Church
In eighteenth century Britain, the king's dual status as leader of the
Church of England and head of the British state was thought essential to the
maintenance of loyalty to crown and Parliament among British subjects. 17 A
similar understanding informed American government prior to the Revolution.'
8
Eight of the original thirteen colonies (and portions of a ninth) established a
specific Protestant denomination by law,' 9 with the goal of developing and pre-
serving popular loyalty to colonial law and government.
20
16 See infra Part V.
17 E.g., WILLIAM WARBURTON, THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (1736) (making
the then-common argument that an alliance between civil government (prohibiting "open mis-
chief') and religion (prohibiting "secret mischief') prevented Hobbesian anarchy); see FELDMAN,
supra note 11, at 22 ("In England and on the European continent, in Catholic and Protestant coun-
tries alike, it had long been assumed that a close relationship between established religion and
government was necessary to maintain social order and national cohesion."); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2114 (2003) (noting that the purpose of the Test, Corporation, and
Conventicles Acts (among others) was in part to "retain the Queen's majesties subjects in their due
obedience," by targeting Catholics and Puritans who were thought to threaten the political legiti-
macy.of the state (quotation omitted)).
18 See McConnell, supra note 17, at 2110-11.
19 Prior to the Revolution, the Church of England was officially established in Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia, as well as in portions of metropolitan New
York. Additionally, each city or town in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts was
authorized by law to select a locally established religion by majority vote; the overwhelming
choice was Congregationalism. There was no established religion in Pennsylvania, Delaware,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and rural New York. Vermont also followed the New England model,
though it was claimed by other colonies until well after the Revolution. Id.
20 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 35; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 427-28 (2d ed. 1998); see also PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 107 (2002) (concluding that even early opponents of estab-
lishment in America acknowledged the importance of religion to government and never intended
to create a constitutional doctrine that completely separated government from religion). Professor
(now Judge) McConnell acknowledges that a pragmatic political stability underlaid the Anglican
establishments, but argues that the Puritan and Congregationalist establishments in New England
were grounded more "on the intense religious convictions of the people." McConnell, supra note
17, at 2115-16.
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B. "Nonsectarian" Christianity
Following the Revolution, the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment forbade the creation of a national church,21 which the substantial
religious diversity of the newly formed American states would have precluded
anyway.22 This same diversity also undermined state religious establishments,
the last of which had disappeared by the 1830s. 23 In their place arose "civil re-
ligion, ' 24 which linked American citizenship and loyalty to a "nonsectarian"
Christian understanding that the United States has a divine origin and destiny.25
The tenets of this civil religion consisted of beliefs purportedly shared by all
Christian religions,26 such as the existence of God, the literal truth of the Bible,
the efficacy of prayer, and the expectation of an afterlife in which virtue is re-
warded and vice is punished.27 Nonsectarian Christianity allowed the states to
countenance close relationships between government and religion while simul-
taneously rejecting the idea of formal denominational establishments.28 Public
schoolchildren were led in prayer and Bible-reading by government-paid teach-
ers,2 9 public prayer became common in the state legislatures, 30 important days of
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .. "); see also id., art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualifi-
cation to any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
22 In addition to the regional differences between Congregationalists and Puritans in New
England and Anglicans in the South at the time of the Revolution, see supra note 18 and accom-
panying text, Rhode Island and certain communities in other of the newly independent states had
been founded as havens for religious dissenters, and Baptist, Jewish, Presbyterian, and Quaker
presences were evident throughout the country. See George Dargo, Religious Toleration and its
Limits in Early America, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 341, 352-53 (1996); see also ANSON PHELPS
STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 21-23 (1950) (noting the substantial religious
diversity in colonial America); THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986) (documenting the same).
23 See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 6
(2003).
24 See supra text accompanying note 5.
25 See BELLAH, supra note 5, at 4 (observing that the "sacredness of the Constitution ... is
closely bound up with the existence of the American people .... "); id. at 27, 44 (arguing that
Jefferson's invocation of the "laws of nature" in the Declaration and his use of biblical imagery
captured the feelings of religious Americans about the United States and its destiny).
26 See FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 61.
27 See ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADiTONAL
WORLD 171-72 (1970); see also John C. Jeffies, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 297-98 (2001).
28 See FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 63, 81; HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 275-84.
29 See FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 81; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 27, at 297-98.
30 See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 118 (2d
ed. 2005); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM.
L. REv. 2083, 2104 (1996).
[Vol. I110
UNCIVIL RELIGION
Christian worship were recognized as civic holidays, 31 biblical and other expres-
sions of devotion to God appeared on government seals, documents, and build-
ings,32 and anti-blasphemy and Sunday-closing laws reinforced respect for the
Christian God and the Christian Sabbath.33
C. Judeo-Christianity
Waves of European immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries exposed "nonsectarian" Christianity as essentially Protestant. 34 This
period is accordingly marked by periodic Catholic and Jewish resistance to as-
similation by "nonsectarian" Christian culture,35 especially in the public
schools. 36 By the 1950s, however, these conflicts had largely abated. Succeed-
ing generations of Catholic and Jewish immigrants had absorbed some of the
Protestant individualism implicit in "nonsectarianism,, 37 while nonsectarianism
itself loosened its ties to Protestant beliefs and observances.38 This permitted a
reformulation of the American civil religion from "nonsectarian" Christianity to
a more plausible transdenominational "Judeo-Christianity. ' '39 Thus did Justice
Douglas declare in the early 1950s that Americans are a "religious" rather than a
31 See WirrE, supra note 30, at 118.
32 Id.; Epstein, supra note 30, at 2112-13.
33 See WrurE, supra note 30, at 118; Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century,
64 ALB. L. REv. 675, 684-85 (2000).
34 See FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 12, 63-64; HAMBURGER, supra note 20, chs. 8, 10; see also
Calvin Massey, The Political Marketplace of Religion, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 11-12 (2005) (observ-
ing that in the late nineteenth century, "Protestant hegemony was preserved by using the political
process to bar government aid to religious institutions regarded as mostly Catholic entities," and
that "the only acceptable form of Christianity was some version of Protestantism").
35 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 77 (describing Protestant "paranoia toward the Catho-
lic church," and a "corresponding elevation of the Bible to the foundational text of American
republicanism," based on the purported "connection among Bible reading, morality, and success-
ful participation in republican government"); Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Relig-
ion Clauses, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 919, 927 (2004) (describing Protestant discrimination against
religious minorities, including Catholics and Jews, during the nineteenth century).
36 See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 209-221 (relating intensification of tensions be-
tween Protestants and Catholics during the nineteenth century as the latter resisted the "nonsectar-
ian" religion in the common schools and accused Protestants of religious intolerance).
37 See FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 90-91; HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 207-09 ("Catholics
in America increasingly felt individualistic expectations" and "adopted a liberalized, American
understanding of their Church," which conceptualized papal authority as "merely of a spiritual
nature" without power to "interfere with the temporal authority of our government.").
38 See Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1243, 1263-64 (2000).
39 See FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 91; Barbara L. Kramer, Reconciling Religious Rights &
Responsibilities, 30 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 439, 440 n.10 (1999); Gerard V. Bradley, The Enduring
Revolution: Law and Theology in the Secular State, 39 EMORY L.J. 217, 218 (1990) (book re-
view).
2007]
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
"Christian" people, and that American institutions presuppose belief in a "Su-
preme Being," which presumably signified the Jewish as well as the Christian
God.4°
It was also in the 1950s that Will Herberg published his classic state-
ment of American civil religion, Protestant-Catholic-Jew.4' Herberg argued
that, unlike other immigrant characteristics like language or national origin,
religious identity did not disappear into the "melting pot" of American assimila-
tion.42 To the contrary, an immigrant entered the mainstream of American life
precisely by retaining his or her religious identity-so long as it was Protestant,
Catholic, or Jewish.43 "Unless one is either a Protestant, or a Catholic, or a Jew,"
Herberg argued, "one is a 'nothing'; to be a 'something,' to have a name, one
must identify oneself to oneself, and be identified by others, as belonging to one
or another of the three great religious communities in which the American peo-
ple are divided." 44 Noting that virtually all Americans identified themselves
with one of these religious groups,45 Herberg concluded that Protestantism, Ca-
tholicism, and Judaism were each a quintessentially American religion and that
"Judeo-Christianity" was thus the American civil religion.46
As Herberg explained, Judeo-Christianity built and maintained loyalty
to the United States by linking certain transdenominational beliefs and obser-
vances of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews with patriotic fervor and national
obligation. This function of Judeo-Christianity seemed particularly important at
the height of the Cold War, in the face of the materialist and atheist threat of
Soviet communism. 47 Judeo-Christianity incorporated longstanding traditions,
like government-sponsored prayer (especially in public schools), programs that
permitted public school students to receive religious instruction during the nor-
mal school hours, and Sunday closing laws. To these it added belief in the di-
vine origin and destiny of the United States, recognition of a transcendent mo-
rality shared by all Americans, faith in American democracy as the last, best
safeguard of individual liberty, and recognition of a monotheistic God who
40 Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) ("We are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.") with Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U-S. 457, 471 (1892) ("'[W]e are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is
deeply ingrafted upon Christianity."') (quoting People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 295 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1811)).
41 See HERBERG, supra note 10.
42 Id. at 40.
43 Id. at 53-54.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 59.
46 Id. at 101.
47 Stephen Bates, "Godless Communism" and Its Legacies, SoctErv, Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 29,
30; see Mark Silk, Notes on the Judeo-Christian Tradition in America, 36 AM. Q. 65, 69-70
(1984).
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gives America his special care and attention.48 These values were consistently
affirmed in the 1950s, as in pledging allegiance to a nation "under God,, 49 de-
claring "In God We Trust" as the national motto and requiring that it be im-
printed on American coins and banknotes, 50 erecting monuments and displays of
the Ten Commandments, 5' and invoking God and his blessing on America in
political speeches and at other public events.52
In contrast to the ironic sectarianism of "nonsectarian" Christianity,
1950s Judeo-Christianity had greater potential to perform the socially unifying
function of civil religion. As is evident from many of its symbols and practices,
it was not so much theological common ground that made Judeo-Christianity
viable as civil religion in the 1950s, but a narrow confluence of broader "spiri-
tual" values that Protestants, Catholics, and Jews each supposedly placed at the
foundation of American society.
Its inclusive potential notwithstanding, Judeo-Christianity did not func-
tion for very long as a unifying force in American society. The relative quies-
cence of the 1950s in the face of the Cold War was followed by the political and
social upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, which included constitutional invalida-
tion of government use of many Judeo-Christian symbols and observances, par-
ticularly in the public schools. 53 In reaction, numerous religious activist groups
48 See, e.g., HERBERG, supra note 10, at 52; see also Mirsky, supra note 6, at 1252 (identifying
the five themes of American civil religion as belief in "some sort of transcendent principle of
morality to which this polity is, or ought to be, responsible"; "faith in democracy as a way of life
for all people and a concomitant belief in an American mission to spread it the world over"; "a
sense of civic piety, that exercising the responsibilities of citizenship is somehow a good end in
itself"; "reverence for American religious folkways"; and "a belief that Destiny has great things in
store for the American people.").
49 See Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C.
§ 4 (2007)).
50 See Act of July 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5114 (b)
(2007)) (mandating the inscription of "In God We Trust" on currency); Act of July 30, 1956, Pub.
L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2007)) (establishing "In God We Trust"
as national motto).
5' See, e.g., Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir 2000) (recounting origins of
widespread distribution of decalogue monuments during the 1950s by the Fraternal Order of the
Eagles in response to a juvenile court judge's suggestion that the Commandments would supply
young people with the moral code of conduct many of them apparently lacked), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 1058 (2001).
52 See, e.g., President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1953), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9600 ("This faith .. . establishes, beyond
debate, those gifts of the Creator that are man's inalienable rights, and that make all men equal in
His sight .... It is because we, all of us, hold to these principles that the political changes accom-
plished this day do not imply turbulence, upheaval or disorder. Rather this change expresses a
purpose of strengthening our dedication and devotion to the precepts of our founding documents,
a conscious renewal of faith in our country and in the watchfulness of a Divine Providence.").
53 See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that public school display of deca-
logue violated Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (same with
respect to ban on teaching any theory of human origin in public schools); Sch. Dist. of Abingdon
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emerged, primarily culturally and politically conservative Christians,54 whose
goals included constitutional justification of the use by government of Judeo-
Christian symbols and observances.55 This coalition of conservative Christians
grew and strengthened throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and entered the twenty-
first century with considerable social and political power.
56
II1. BEYOND JUDEO-CHRISTIANITY
Judeo-Christianity is still the American civil religion and continues to
inform Establishment Clause doctrine, as the Decalogue Cases make clear.
Trends in religious demographics, however, suggest that Judeo-Christianity can
no longer plausibly claim to capture the beliefs of nearly all Americans and,
correspondingly, that it can no longer plausibly claim to function as a socially
and politically unifying civil religion.
A. Unbelief and Eastern Religion
Judging solely from Justice Scalia's rhetoric,57 one would think that the
current number and devotion of American Protestants, Catholics, and Jews is
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (same with respect to public school-sponsored prayer and Bible-
,reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (same with respect to nondenominational govern-
ment-composed prayer offered at the start of each school day); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(196 1) (same with respect to state requirement that notaries affirm belief in God).
54 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 192-93 (describing the political influence and values
agenda of Rev. Jerry Falwell's "Moral Majority" and Rev. Pat Robertson's "Christian Coalition"
in the late 1970s and 1980s); Nancy T. Ammerman, Deep and Wide: The Real American Evan-
gelicals, AM. INTEREST, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 25, 30 (suggesting that conservative Christians were
"propelled ... into politics" by, inter alia, the "'moral breakdown' signaled by the Supreme
Court's 1963 school prayer decision, its 1973 abortion decision, and the general upheaval of the
proverbial Sixties").
For a succinct and insightful account of the political emergence of religious conservatism in the
latter part of the Twentieth century, see KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW's EXPRESSION
ch.1 (1993).
55 See KARST, supra note 54, at 10, 148.
Some commentators have recently suggested that Christian conservatives themselves are now
divided over many of these initiatives. See Russell Cobb, Cracks in the Christian Ascendancy,
SLATE, June 27, 2006, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2144522; E.J. Dionne, Jr., A Shift
Among the Evangelicals, WASH. POST, June 16, 2006, at A25, available at http://www.washing-
tonpost.comwp-dyncontent/article/2006/06/15/AR2006061501790.html.
56 See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, Up Against the Wall of Separation: The Question of American
Religious Democracy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 555 (2005) (arguing that conservative Chris-
tian influence on American politics has transformed the United States into a "religious democ-
racy"). See generally MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN
NATIONALISM (2006); KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERIL AND POLITICS OF
RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2006); infra notes 116-
120 and accompanying text.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
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virtually unchanged since the 1950s, save only for the addition of a few Mus-
lims. It is true, of course, that adherents to Buddhism, Hinduism, and other non-
Western or non-monotheistic religions still constitute less than two percent of all
adult Americans. 58 Emphasis on the small absolute number of such adherents,
however, ignores their dramatic growth over the last half century.5 9 Moreover,
Justice Scalia's decision to focus on monotheists as a percentage of the popula-
tion of believers obscures the equally dramatic increase of unbelievers in the
United States, now between ten and fifteen percent of the population,60 com-pared to three percent or less during the heyday of Judeo-Christianity. 6I
58 See, e.g., BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., GRADUATE CENTER OF THE CITY UNIV. OF N.Y.,
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY (2001) (reporting adult Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu,
Baha'I, Taoist, and Sikh affiliation in 2001 at slightly over 3 million, or about 1.5% of the popula-
tion), reprinted in U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-
2005, 2004, at 55; CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2007, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/index.html (reporting American Muslim population at 1% of the adult population,
or approximately 3 million).
59 See RELIGIONS OF AMERICA 196-97 (Leo Rosten, ed., 1955) (reporting that in 1953 Bud-
dhists numbered only 63,000 or 0.04% of a population of about 95 million, and noting that Mus-
lims were present in the United States but no statistical reports of their numbers were available);
Stephen J. Stein, Religion/Religions in the United States: Changing Perspectives and Prospects,
75 IND. L.J. 37, 53-54 (2000) (detailing the "dramatic increase in the number of religious persons
other than Christians and Jews in North America" during the latter part of the 20th century); see
also Walter Russell Mead, God's Country?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2006, at 24, 42 (noting the
"growing presence and influence of non-Christian communities in the [United States]-of Jews,
Muslims, Buddhists, [and] Hindus"); CIA, supra note 58 (reporting that 10% of the American
population in 2002 reported themselves as affiliated with a religious denomination or sect that was
neither Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Jewish, or Muslim); Harris Interactive Election
2000 Poll, http://www.adherents.cor/relUSA.html (reporting that 10% of a random 13,224
person sample of 5.6 million American registered voters identified through the Internet described
themselves as affiliated with a religious denomination or sect that was neither Christian nor Jew-
ish).
60 See, e.g., KOSMIN ET AL., supra note 58 (reporting that 14.1% of all adult Americans in 2001
described themselves as being atheist, agnostic, humanist, or secular, or as having no religion at
all, and that an additional 5.4% refused to specify a religious identification); GLENN H. UlTER &
JAMES L. TRUE, CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 26 (2004) (concluding
that "the largest percentage gain" reported in survey data between 1965 and 1996 "was in the
secular category, which includes those stating no religious preference as well as respondents stat-
ing that they are atheists or agnostics," and which increased from 9.7% of survey respondents in
1965 to 16.3% of respondents in 1996); Harris Interactive Election 2000 Poll, supra note 59 (re-
porting that 7.1% of a random 13,224 person sample of 5.6 million American registered voters
identified through the Internet described themselves as "agnostic" or "atheist," and that an addi-
tional 10% described themselves as "nonreligious" or refused to answer); see also U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 58, Table 67, at 55 (reporting that the number of self-identified unbelievers in
2001 had more than doubled since 1990); CIA, supra note 58 (reporting that in 2002, 10% of
Americans declined to identify themselves as members of any religious denomination); Ammer-
man, supra note 54, at 27 (observing that "nearly 20 percent of the [American] population never
goes anywhere religious at all").
The recent study conducted by the Baylor Institute for Studies of Religion suggests that only
4% of Americans are nonbelievers. See BAYLOR INSTITUTE FOR STUDIES OF RELIGION, AMERICAN
PIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 8, 12 (2006) [hereinafter BAYLOR INSTITUTE], available at
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B. Spirituality
Additionally, a turn towards "spirituality" has arisen among American
believers within the last twenty years. This is a new attitude of belief that can-
not properly be characterized as either predominantly secular or traditionally
religious.62 Spirituality is characterized by personal choice-by adherence to a
faith or religion based on the individual needs it satisfies, rather than the truth-
claims it makes or the conversion experience it may generate.63  Spirituality
incorporates the consumer mentality of a marketplace in which believers shop
for beliefs and practices, picking and choosing from among diverse and even
incompatible denominations and traditions. 64 Whereas the principal focus of
traditional denominational religion is on revelation of a reality beyond the tem-
http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/33304.pdf (reporting that 10.8% of Ameri-
cans are not affiliated with a "congregation, denomination, or other religious group," but that
62.9% of these nevertheless "believe in God or some higher power"); see also Where We Stand on
Faith, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5, 2005, at 48 (reporting that only 6% of Americans describe themselves
as "atheist," "agnostic," or having "no religion," and that only an additional 4% declined to an-
swer). It is not clear, however, that the "belief' of this group extends significantly beyond agnos-
ticism. See BAYLOR INSTITUTE, supra, at 14 (reporting that overwhelming majorities of relig-
iously unaffiliated Americans "never" attend weekly services, pray, or read scripture, and reject
the Bible as the word of God); cf. infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (arguing that the ob-
ject of faith for many who are routinely classified as monotheistic "believers" is not recognizable
as the traditional God of American monotheism).
61 George Gallup, American Institute of Public Opinion (Jan. 9, 1948) (reporting that only 3%
of Americans disclaimed belief in God, and only 3% expressed uncertainty about such belief),
reprinted in RELIGIONS OF AMERICA, supra note 59, at 247; George Gallup, American Institute of
Public Opinion (Dec. 9, 1944) (reporting that only 1% of Americans identified themselves as not
believing in God, and only 5% as undecided), reprinted in, RELIGIONS OF AMERICA, supra note 59,
at 237.
The rate of unbelief is also three times as great among the young as the old. See, e.g.,
Where We Stand on Faith, supra note 60 (reporting in 2005 that 9% of those age 18 to 39 describe
their religion as "atheist," compared to 3% of those age 60 or older); cf. BAYLOR INSTITUTE, supra
note 60, at 9 (reporting in 2006 that 18.6% of those age 18 to 30 declared no religious affiliation,
compared to 5.4% of those age 65 or older). While this might indicate that the proportion of
unbelievers in the United States will continue to grow, any such growth would be blunted or per-
haps neutralized altogether by unbelievers who return to religion as they age and approach death.
62 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 59, at 58 (observing that contemporary religion "is increasingly
likely to be defined as any system of belief or practices resembling" denominational religion, and
that "a growing number of Americans ... completely reject the word 'religious' and in its place
use the word 'spiritual"').
63 For a detailed discussion of postmodern spirituality, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spiritual-
ity, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the End of Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 1197, 1215-
19 (2005).
64 See, e.g., Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Prac-
tice and its Importance to the Law, 51 BuFF. L. REv. 127 (2003); see also Stein, supra note 59, at
57 (arguing that "[d]enominational categories are no longer sufficient or primary religious identi-
fiers for many contemporary Americans").
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poral self, the emphasis of spirituality is on revelation of that very self.65 Be-
tween 20% and 25% of Americans identify themselves as "spiritual but not reli-
gious.
66
There is undoubtedly some overlap among the categories of unbelief
and non-Western and non-monotheistic religion, on the one hand, and spiritual-
ity, on the other, so that one cannot simply add the percentages representing
these categories together to calculate a percentage of Americans who find them-
selves outside of the Judeo-Christian mainstream. The number of adherents to
spirituality, for example, almost certainly includes some who would describe
themselves as either nonbelievers or followers of eastern religions.67 Similarly,
such adherents also undoubtedly include members of Christian denominations
whose spiritual understanding of their faith would not be acceptable to more
orthodox members.68 Nevertheless, the overlap is not total-that is, one cannot
assume that all of the "spiritual but not religious" would classify themselves as
unbelievers, followers of a non-Western or non-monotheistic religion, or mem-
bers of a Christian denomination; some, for example, might classify themselves
as believers unaffiliated with any religious tradition.
C. Barely Believing
Finally, postmodem sensibilities have eroded even traditional denomi-
national understandings of "God" and belief. One effect of the postmodern
spirituality movement has been a shift away from denominational Christianity
and the truth of its doctrines, even among members of some traditionally con-
servative denominations. 69 A substantial minority of American believers, for
example, recall the Enlightenment deists, describing their object of faith as a
"distant" God who "sets the laws of nature in motion," is unconcerned about
65 Gedicks, supra note 63, at 1219; see, e.g., ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN RELIGION 182-84 (2003) (describing spirituality as a "blending of psychology and
religion" that avoids traditional notions of sin and duty and focuses on concepts of self-esteem and
personal growth); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 67 (2002) ("At the time of the Framing, religion, for
many Americans, was a source of comprehensive understanding about Divine Providence and the
order of the universe. The rise of science, technology, psychoanalysis, and other profoundly
secularizing influences, however, has altered perceptions about the role of religion. For many
Americans, religion is now affective, psychological, and interior.").
66 Where We Stand on Faith, supra note 60 (emphasis added). Regrettably, the Baylor Insti-
tute study did not include questions about postmodern spirituality. See BAYLOR INSTITUTE, supra
note 60, App. B (listing survey questions used in the study).
67 See Massey, supra note 34, at 18 (noting "considerable overlap" between spirituality and
psychology, and observing that practitioners of spirituality often combine the metaphysics of
eastern religions with psychology).
68 See Gedicks, supra note 63, at 1216, 1218.
69 Gedicks, supra note 63, at 1216-18; e.g., Charles Trueheart, Welcome to the Next Church,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1996, at 37 (describing the evangelical megachurch movement).
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human activities, and does not intervene in earthly events.70 Some members of
the Protestant mainline-American Baptists, Congregationalists, Episcopals,
Lutherans, Methodists, and Presbyterians-are skeptical about the divinity of
Jesus, oppose literal-historical understandings of the Bible, and reject Jesus's
miracles, including the resurrection.71 Such trends are even evident among
evangelical Protestants; large numbers of teenage evangelicals, for example, do
not believe in the resurrection and reject the idea of absolute truth, believing that
"all religious faiths teach equally valid truths. 72  These postmodern beliefs
seem to be positioned equidistant between traditional Christian belief and ag-
nosticism; at the least, the disconnected and atheological "God" of postmodern
believers bears little resemblance to the omniscient and omnipotent "God" of
the Judeo-Christian tradition.
It is not clear that 1950s Judeo-Christianity was ever as broad and inclu-
sive as it claimed to be, particularly with respect to non-Christians like Jews and
marginalized Christians like Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mormons.
The dramatic growth of unbelief and religious pluralism generally has rendered
the breadth of Judeo-Christianity even more problematic. One can reliably es-
timate that between one-quarter and one-third of Americans no longer fall
within the traditional denominational definitions of Protestant, Catholic, or Jew.
Even if one adds Islam to create a marginally larger "Abrahamic" monothe-
ism,73 it remains that at least a quarter of Americans adhere to religions or reli-
gious beliefs that would place them outside the orthodox boundaries of even this
reformulation, or do not believe in a god at all. Even among the American ma-
jority touted by Justice Scalia as "monotheistic believers," traditional faith in a
traditional God is often absent.
70 BAYLOR INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 27, 29 (reporting that 24.4% of Americans believe in
such a God).
71 Mead, supra note 59, at 30; see also id. at 31 (describing the Protestant mainline as having a
"lower estimate of the difference between Christians and non-Christians than do the other major
forms of American Protestantism," and attaching little importance to the "idea of the church as a
supernatural society whose members enjoy special grace").
72 See Dale Buss, Christian Teens? Not Very, WALL ST. J., Jul. 9, 2004, at W13 (reporting
findings of evangelical youth minister Josh McDowell that 91% of born-again teenage evangeli-
cals do not believe in absolute truth, that a "slight majority" reject the resurrection, and that nearly
60% believe that "all religious faiths teach equally valid truths"). Rev. McDowell's website sug-
gests that his conclusions were drawn from findings of the Barna Research Group. See Josh
McDowell, Teen Statistics, http://www.josh.org/notes/fileInternetl 6-TeenStatistics.pdf (citing
Barna Research Group, Americans Are Most Likely to Base Truth on Feelings (Feb. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.barna.org/FlexPage.aspx?Page=BarnaUpdate&BarnaUpdatelD=106).
73 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893-94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that government acknowledgment of the nondenominational monotheistic God of Chris-
tianity, Islam, and Judaism does not constitute an establishment of religion); see also Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687, 690 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality) (same with respect to govern-
ment invocation of "God" and the "Judeo-Christian belief").
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IV. THE "SECTARIANIZATION" OF JUDEO-CHRISTIANITY
Demographically, the United States is now well beyond the point where
the symbols and practices of either a "Judeo-Christian" or an "Abrahamic" civil
religion can authentically represent the religious commitments of all or nearly
all Americans. Even more problematic for Judeo-Christianity is a cultural
counter-revolution of conservative Christians seeking to narrow the meaning of
Judeo-Christian symbols and practices, even as increasing numbers of unbeliev-
ers and less orthodox believers already find themselves outside the traditionally
broad meaning associated with such symbols and practices.
A. The Decalogue Cases
During the night of July 31, 2001, Roy Moore, then the Chief Justice of
the Alabama Supreme Court, arranged for the installation of a two and one-half
ton granite representation of the Ten Commandments in a prominent location in
the Alabama state courthouse.74 The installation was filmed by the Coral Ridge
Baptist Church, but no members of the media were present or, apparently, in-
vited.75 In a dedicatory speech the next day, Chief Justice Moore left no doubt
that the monument symbolized the sovereignty of God over the state as well as
the church. Referring to quotations from secular historical sources carved on
the sides of the monument below the focal representation of the Command-
ments, Chief Justice Moore declared that the monument displayed
every ounce of support for the acknowledgment of the sover-
eignty of ... God and those absolute standards upon which our
laws are based. Oh, this isn't surrounding the plaque with his-
tory, historical documents. All history supports the acknowl-
edgment of God. You'll find no documents surrounding the
Ten Commandments because they stand alone as an acknowl-
edgment of that God that's contained in our pledge, contained
in our motto, and contained in our oath.76
Elsewhere in this speech and in his trial testimony during subsequent litigation,
Moore made clear that the "God" to which he referred was the God of Judeo-
Christian civil religion.77
74 See Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (M.D. Ala. 2002), affd, 335 F.3d 1282
(1 th Cir. 2003).
75 Id. at 1294.
76 Id. app. C., at 1324.
77 Id. at 1299 (summarizing Chief Justice Moore's trial testimony that "the Judeo-Christian
God reigned over both the church and the state in [the United States] and that both owed alle-
giance to that God"); e.g., id. app. C., at 1323 (copy of Moore's dedicatory speech) ("Today a cry
has gone out across our land for the acknowledgment of that God upon whom this nation and our
laws were founded and for those simple truths which our forefathers found to be self-evident; but
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Chief Justice Moore's unapologetically Judeo-Christian defense of the
placement of a conspicuous religious monument in the state courthouse trig-
gered more than two years of hard-fought litigation, 78 together with intense me-
dia coverage and public demonstrations.79  The controversy ended in the re-
moval of the monument from the courthouse as a violation of the Establishment
Clause and the removal of Moore as Chief Justice of Alabama for defying a
federal court order to remove the monument.
Moore's effort to defend government sponsorship of a sectarian display
of the Ten Commandments is not an isolated incident. In the last few years,
other lower court decisions have examined other decalogue monuments appar-
ently erected with comparable sectarian motivations,80 and the United States
once again, we find that those cries have fallen upon eyes that have seen not, ears that hear not our
prayers, and hearts much like that nether millstone."); see also id. app C., at 1322- 24 (quoting and
summarizing references to "God" in or by the preamble to the Alabama Constitution; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 562-63 (1961); the Declaration of Independence; the 1954 revision of
the Pledge of Allegiance; Samuel Adams; James Madison; William Blackstone; George Washing-
ton; the "Star-Spangled Banner;" the national motto; executive, judicial, and legislative oaths of
office; John Jay; and Thomas Jefferson).
78 See id.; see also Glassroth v. Houston, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (granting
substitution of Senior Associate Justice of Alabama Supreme Court as defendant in Moore's place
following Moore's removal as Chief Justice and denying Moore's motion that such Justice recuse
himself from participation in the litigation); Glassroth v. Moore, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Ala.
2003) (denying Moore's motion for stay of final judgment and entrance of injunction pending
action on petition for review by Supreme Court); Glassroth v. Moore, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (M.D.
Ala. 2003) (entering final judgment and permanent injunction against Moore on remand from
Court of Appeals); Glassroth v. Moore, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (granting motion
that court enter permanent injunction and order removal of monument after Moore failed to do so
voluntarily following court's prior decision that monument violated Establishment Clause); Glass-
roth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (denying Moore's motion that district
judge recuse himself for bias against Moore); Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n., 891 So.2d 848
(Ala. 2004) (affirming Commission order removing Moore as Alabama Chief Justice for failure to
obey federal court orders).
79 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Supporters of Ten Commandments Rally On, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 2003, at N20.
80 See, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2002) (2-1 decision) (invalidating
large state-sponsored Commandments monument surrounded by quotes of famous Americans
"professing their beliefs in the Bible, God, or Christianity," a quote from a Supreme Court deci-
sion declaring the United States to be a "Christian nation," and containing two "Stars of David
and the Chi rho symbol"), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 999 (2003); Turner v. Habersham County, 290 F.
Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (invalidating county-sponsored plaque of King James version of
the "Ten Commandments of Almighty God," where county resolution stated that Commandments
were posted "in consideration of our biblical history of Georgia, both in our constitution and devo-
tional acts in our heritage," and for the purpose of petitioning "the God of Heaven to preserve the
peace which he has so graciously extended to [us] by our ancient acknowledgment of the Ten
Commandments," and begging God's "continued protection and alleviation of ills which come to
those who forget him and his law") (emphasis omitted); ACLU v. Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp.
2d 757, 764 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) (invalidating county-sponsored plaque containing King James
version of the Commandments, where motivation of county commissioner who sponsored author-
izing legislation was to "have copies of 'God's law posted all over [the] county').
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Supreme Court has recently reviewed three decalogue displays and monuments,
two of which had an origin and history similar to those of Moore's Alabama
monument.
Two displays were reviewed by the Supreme Court in McCreary
County v. ACLU of Kentucky. 8' Both involved the hanging of "large, gold-
framed copies" of an abridgment of the "King James version of the Command-
ments," complete with citation to Exodus, in a prominent place in a county
courthouse accompanied by explicitly religious or Christian endorsements.82 In
response to legal challenges under the Establishment Clause, both counties
added smaller displays of excerpts from secular documents that referred to God,
religious symbols, or observances, including the Declaration of Independence,
the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, the national motto, a congressional
proclamation declaring 1983 as the "Year of the Bible," a proclamation by
President Lincoln declaring a "National Day of Prayer and Humiliation," a quo-
tation by President Lincoln identifying the Bible as "the best gift God has ever
given to man," and the Mayflower Compact.83 These additions were ordered by
county resolutions that expressly invoked Moore's arguments in defense of his
Alabama monument, called Jesus the "Prince of Ethics," and appealed to a pur-
ported belief of the founders that government officials were obligated "'to pub-
licly acknowledge God as the source of America's strength and direction."
'84
The Court declared these displays unconstitutional under the Establishment
Clause for lack of a secular purpose.85
Contemporaneous with its review of the decalogue displays in
McCreary County, the Court reviewed another such display in Van Orden v.
Perry.86 This display is a large stone monument of the King James version of
the Commandments located on the grounds of a State Capitol among numerous
secular and historical monuments.87 The monument is one of hundreds that the
Fraternal Order of the Eagles donated to state and local governments in the
1950s to encourage juveniles to refrain from anti-social behavior.88 In addition
to the Commandments, the monument also contains representations of "[a]n
eagle grasping the American flag," a pyramidal all-seeing eye, "two stars of
81 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
82 Id. at 851.
83 Id. at 853-54.
84 Id. at 853 (quoting exhibits). These displays were altered yet a third time in the course of
this litigation, by removing the other document displays and adding for display along with the
Commandments equal-sized representations "of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independ-
ence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics to the Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the Na-
tional Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice," together
with a statement of the "historical and legal significance" of each such document. Id. at 856.
85 Id. at 868-70.
86 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
87 Id. at 681 (plurality opinion).
88 See id. at 682 (plurality opinion); id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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David, and the two superimposed Greek letters Chi and Rho, which traditionally
signify Christ.89 In a decision that did not yield a majority opinion, the Court
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the monument on the apparent
ground that the context in which the monument appeared suggested secular as
well as religious purposes.90
B. The Fiction of "Mere Acknowledgment"
The characteristic religious motivation for public decalogue exhibits
contrasts sharply with the manner in which their constitutionality is defended
against Establishment Clause challenges. One of the standard rhetorical moves
of those who defend government appropriation of Judeo-Christian symbols and
practices is deemphasis of their theological content and contemporary religious
significance.9' Supreme Court opinions defending government deployment of
Judeo-Christian symbols and observances consistently characterize them as his-
torical, passive, generic, and innocuous.92 The Decalogue Cases are no excep-
89 Id. at 681 (plurality opinion).
90 Id. at 691-92 (plurality opinion) (arguing that because the state "has treated its Capitol
grounds monuments as representing the several strands in the State's political and legal history,"
the setting "of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, partaking
of both religion and government"); id. at 701-02 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that the place-
ment of the disputed decalogue monument in a "large park containing 17 monuments and 21
historical markers" illustrates "a relation between ethics and law that the State's citizens, histori-
cally speaking, have endorsed," and thus communicates "a ... secular [moral] message" about
proper standards of social conduct").
91 Professor Gedicks has elaborated this point in FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF
CHURCH AND STATE 74-80 (1995). See also KARST, supra note 54, at 154-55 (describing but not
endorsing arguments that government use of Judeo-Christian symbols does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because such use is a "de minimus endorsement of religion, has a long historical
pedigree, and is passive and noncoercive); Epstein, supra note 30, 2164-65 ("Another popular
argument used to justify the constitutional permissibility of ceremonial deism is that through rote
repetition, transformations which have occurred over time, and the emergence of secular and
patriotic traditions associated with religious holidays, these practices have lost whatever religious
significance they may once have had."); Alexandra Furth, Comment, Secular Idolatry and Sacred
Traditions: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Secularization Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 579,
591-92 (1998) ("Where a practice or symbol is perceived as integral to American culture, or
where the context of a display which includes religious articles creates an impression of mere
holiday celebration or religious pluralism, the symbols will be recharacterized as secular."); Ste-
ven G. Gey, "Under God," The Pledge of Allegiance, and other Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L.
REv. 1865, 1905 (2003) (noting the common argument that "'God' in the context of the Pledge is
not a sufficiently religious concept to implicate the protections of the Establishment Clause").
92 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989) (conceding religious
significance of Jewish menorah, but arguing that it also signifies a secular cultural tradition akin to
Christmas and that both Christmas and Chanukah are secular symbols of the same "winter-
holiday" season); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (characterizing nativity scene as
passive commemoration of the historical origins of Christmas, and promoting friendship and a
means of promoting "a friendly community spirit of goodwill"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961) (characterizing Sunday closing laws as promoting rest, relaxation, recreation, commu-
nity, and family togetherness, rather than church attendance or Sabbath observance); see also Elk
[Vol. 110
UNCIVIL RELIGION
tion. The Van Orden plurality, for example, minimizes the religious signifi-
cance of the monument at issue in that case by repeatedly characterizing it as a
mere passive "acknowledgment" of the religious history and heritage of the
United States.93 Individual opinions in both McCreary County and Van Orden
follow the same pattern.94
The theme of these opinions is that displays of the Commandments con-
stitute only the faintest recognition of a nonsectarian God. Decalogue displays,
in other words, purportedly symbolize nothing more than ecumenical, transde-
nominational belief. The implication is that objections to such a benign and
innocuous symbolic meaning betray an unreasonable hostility to religion.95 In
Grove Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26, 31 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
judgment) (arguing that "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is neither an expression nor an
endorsement of religious belief but merely acknowledges that the United States was founded on
belief in God); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 322, 324 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that prayer by a peer-selected student before high school football games
solemnized the game, promoted sportsmanship and safety, and created a proper competitive envi-
ronment, and speculating that students might choose those giving prayers on the basis of public
speaking ability or social standing rather than religion).
93 545 U.S. 677, 688 (2005) (plurality opinion) (Monuments and other official government
"acknowledgments of the role played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation's heritage are
common throughout America."); accord id. at 683 ("Our cases, Januslike, point in two directions
in applying the Establishment Clause. One face looks toward the strong role played by religion
and religious traditions throughout our Nation's history .... The other face looks toward the
principle that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom
.... One face looks to the past in acknowledgment of our Nation's heritage, while the other looks
to the present in demanding a separation between church and state."); id. at 686 (plurality opinion)
(characterizing the Lemon test as "not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that
Texas has erected"); id. at 689 (plurality opinion) ("Our opinions, like our [Supreme Court] build-
ing have recognized the role the Decalogue plays in America's heritage."); id. at 691 (plurality
opinion) ("The placement of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol
grounds is a far more passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone [v. Graham], where the
text confronted elementary school students every day.").
94 See id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]here is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favor-
ing religion generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a non-
proselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments."); id. at 692 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(The plurality "properly recognizes the role of religion in this Nation's history and the permissibil-
ity of government displays acknowledging that history."); id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("The mere presence of the monument [on the capitol grounds] involves no coercion and thus
does not violate the Establishment Clause."); id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) (characterizing
the Judeo-Christian symbols reviewed by the Court "benign signs and postings"); McCreary
County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 892 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Why, one wonders, is not
respect for the Ten Commandments a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the
people of this country?"); id. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Historical practices thus demonstrate
that there is a distance between the acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment of a
religion."); id. at 905 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The acknowledgment of the contribution that relig-
ion in general, and the Ten Commandments in particular, have made to our Nation's legal and
governmental heritage is surely no more of a step toward the establishment of religion than was
the practice of legislative prayer .. ").
95 Cf. Gey, supra note 91, at 1914 (noting and criticizing the common observation that the
only people upset by "trivial" government establishments like "In God We Trust" on coins or
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this view, official government recognition of the Ten Commandments is like the
polite nod one gives to an acquaintance passing on the street. This rhetoric of
"mere acknowledgment" ignores that the symbols and practices of Judeo-
Christian civil religion are widely perceived as religious, Christian, and sectar-
ian, having little to do with contemporary secular law.
1. Religious Meaning
The religious content of the Ten Commandments can hardly be gain-
said.96 The Commandments prohibit, among other things, unbelief, polytheism,
the worship of icons and images, blasphemy, coveting, Sabbath-breaking, paren-
tal disrespect, and adultery. These are attitudes and actions that would not--and
could not--be criminalized under contemporary constitutional jurisprudence.97
Only the prohibitions on murder, theft, and perjury have a secular content that is
fairly reflected in contemporary law.
98
"under God" in the Pledge are "hypersensitive religious spoilsports") (discussing Newdow v.
United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Elkgrove Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1 (2004)); Newdow, 292 F.3d at 613 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[S]uch phrases as "In God We Trust" or "under God" have no tendency to establish a religion in
this country or to suppress anyone's exercise, or non-exercise, of religion, except in the fevered
eye of persons who most fervently would like to drive all tincture of religion out of the public life
of our polity."); c.f Timothy Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil Communion, and the
Establishment Clause, 79 IowA L. REv. 35, 86 (1993) ("Justice Scalia implicitly assumes that
anyone who cannot endure an innocuous civic prayer is simply a bigot.") (discussing the gradua-
tion prayer at issue in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
96 See Epstein, supra note 30, at 2165 ("[U]nder any honest appraisal of modern American
society, the practices constituting ceremonial deism have not lost their religious significance."); cf.
Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First Amendment
Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2261, 2297 (2004) (arguing that in the creche cases the
Court was "indifferent" to the "constitutive meaning sacred symbols have for those who truly
believe in them") (discussing County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984)).
97 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1981) (observing that decalogue prohibitions on
polytheism, idolatry, blasphemy, and Sabbath-breaking specify "religious duties of believers");
Arnold H. Lowey, Morals Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REv. 159, 162-
66 (2003) (arguing that government enforcement of decalogue prohibitions on disbelief in the
monotheistic God, making graven images of God, blasphemy, and coveting would clearly violate
the Establishment Clause, and that such enforcement of decalogue prohibitions on Sabbath-
breaking, parental disrespect, and adultery would avoid violating the Clause only in particular
circumstances).
98 See Lowey, supra note 97, at 162; see also Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42 (observing that only the
prohibitions on honoring one's parents, murder, adultery, theft, perjury, and coveting are "argua-
bly secular").
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2. Christian Meaning
The meaning symbolized by decalogue displays is not just religious but
also Christian. As the context of these displays inevitably makes clear, display-
ing the Commandments is usually about honoring the Christian God.99 It is al-
most always a Christian majority that seeks to impose Judeo-Christian symbols
and observances on the community,' ° even when, like the decalogue displays,
these take the form of a Jewish text or symbol.' 0 It is no accident that both
Jewish members of the Court voted to invalidate the overtly Christian displays
in McCreary County that Justice Scalia and other conservative Justices would
have upheld, 10 2 and that one of these same Justices also dissented from the
Court's constitutional validation of the less religiously charged monument in
Van Orden.'0
3
In fact, Judeo-Christianity is far more congenial to the beliefs of Chris-
tians than it is to those of Jews. Because conventional Christian theology gen-
erally characterizes Judaism as a proto-Christianity that was "completed" or
"fulfilled" with Jesus and the resurrection, °4 Christians can incorporate Judaism
into their faith in a way that Jews cannot incorporate Christianity into theirs.1
0 5
99 See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
100 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (school sponsored prayers
delivered by evangelical Protestant students at high school football games); County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 581 (1989) (government sponsored Christmas nativity scene); Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (same); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing
law); see also Furth, supra note 91, at 604 (observing that symbols of civil religion whose use by
government is defended because of their purportedly "secularized" character are usually Chris-
tian). But see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (government sponsored prayer delivered by
Jewish rabbi at junior high school graduation).
101 See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. 581 (1989) (government sponsored display of Christmas tree
with Jewish menorah); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (state law mandating the teach-
ing of creationism together with Darwinism in public schools to balance that latter's challenge to
literal readings of Genesis creation story); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (state law
prohibiting the teaching of Darwinism in public schools because of challenge to literal readings of
Genesis creation story).
102 See 545 U.S. 844, 848 (noting that Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., joined the majority opinion of
Souter, J.); compare KARST, supra note 54, at 157 (noting that the authors of the two main dis-
sents to a Ninth Circuit opinion upholding state recognition of Good Friday as an official holiday
were, respectively, Baha'I and Jewish).
103 See 545 U.S. 677, 707, 737 (noting that Ginsburg, J., joined the dissenting opinions of Ste-
vens & Souter, JJ., respectively).
104 See, e.g., ARTHUR A. COHEN, THE MYTH OF THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITION 55-56, 69-70
(1970); see also JOAN DELFATrORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA'S
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 312 (2004) ("Islam has an analogous attitude towards Christianity, which makes
it unlikely that any sort of 'Abrahamic' tradition drawn from Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
could effectively succeed Judeo-Christianity as a unifying American civil religion.").
105 See Mark V. Tushnet, The Conception of Tradition in Constitutional Historiography, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 93, 94 n.6 (1987) ("I had thought that the Judeo-Christian tradition was
actually a Christian tradition; that is, only Christians can describe a Judeo-Christian tradition
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To the extent that the "Judeo-Christian" tradition symbolizes essential Christian
beliefs, its symbolism obviously and necessarily excludes Jews. Notwithstand-
ing its name, "Judeo-Christianity" is essentially a Christian tradition whose
symbols and observances include a symbolic meaning that Jews do not accept.
As Christians ourselves, we obviously cannot speak for Jews or other
non-Christian minorities. But as Christians, we can express our informed sense
that many Christians would find it problematic if "Jehovah" or "Allah" were
substituted in place of the ubiquitous and purportedly inclusive "God" of Judeo-
Christianity. 1°6 Whether one pledges allegiance to the United States, for exam-
ple, as nation under "Jehovah," "Allah," or "God," is not a matter of indiffer-
ence to American Christians,1 °7 just as we expect that it is not a matter of indif-
because they orient themselves to a set of ideas that includes elements that comprise the essence
of Judaism. Conversely, Jews do not orient themselves to a set of ideas that includes elements
that comprise the essence of Christianity."); id.; accord Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public
Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 499, 504-06 (1998)
(similarly observing that "the common appeal to a purportedly Judeo-Christian tradition" ignores
"that Jews are not Christians"); Silk, supra note 47, at 78-79 (detailing numerous ways in which
Christianity theologically contradicts Judaism); see also Martin E. Marty, A Judeo-Christian
Looks at the Judeo-Christian Tradition, 103 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 858, 859 (1986) (arguing
that literal and metaphorical violations of the Jews "have provided the main plot of Jewish-
Christian interaction," and that a proper account of the "Judeo-Christian tradition" would have as
its largest component stories "about imposed ghettos, pogroms, persecutions and killings").
106 Cf Epstein, supra note 30, at 2084-86 (imagining a predominantly Muslim United States
pervaded by official references and appeals to "Allah," in which most Christians and Jews would
feel like outsiders); George Cardinal Pell, Islam and Us, FIRST THINGS (June/July 2006), at 34 ("It
is true that Christianity, Judaism, and Islam claim Abraham as their father and the God of Abra-
ham as their God. I accept, with reservations, the claim that Jews, Christians, and Muslims wor-
ship the same God, but this has been disputed, not only by Christians but by Muslims as well. It is
difficult to recognize the God of the New Testament in the God of the Qur'an, and two very dif-
ferent concepts of the human person have emerged from the Christian and Muslim understandings
of God. This has had significant consequences for the different cultures that Christianity and
Islam have given rise to and for the scope of what is possible within them.").
107 A powerful example that Judeo-Christianity does not function as an inclusive monotheistic
civil religion was provided by the widespread outrage expressed by many religious conservatives,
including one member of Congress, at the prospect that Keith Ellison (D-Minn.), a Muslim newly
elected to Congress, would take his oath of office on the Qur'an rather than the Bible. See Amy
Argetsinger & Roxanne Roberts, But It's Thomas Jefferson's Koran!, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2007,
at C03 (reporting that Rep. Virgil Goode (R-Va.) called Ellison's plan to take the oath on the
Qur'an a threat to American values), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynlcontentlarticle/2007/01/03/AR2007010300075.html; Andrea Stone, Newly elected Muslim
lawmaker underfire, USA TODAY.COM, Dec. 1, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/new-
s/washington/2006-12-01-muslim-lawmaker x.htm (reporting view of conservative radio talk-
show host Dennis Prager-who is, apparently and ironically, Jewish--that Ellison should not be
permitted to take the oath on the Qur'an "because the act undermines American culture," and that
a representative is who is unable to take the oath of office on a "Christian Bible" should not serve
in Congress); see also KARST, supra note 54, at 158 (relating strong and widespread negative
public reaction to invocation by Buddhist priest at state university graduation ceremony in the
early 1990s). Goode's and Prager's views drew widespread support in the conservative blo-
gosphere, but were condemned by at least one prominent religious conservative, Kevin Hasson,
president of The Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty. See Stone, supra.
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ference to Jews, Muslims, or adherents to other theistic faiths. °8 The "God" of
Judeo-Christianity is not a nondenominational term,' 09 any more than the Ten
Commandments constitute a nondenominational symbol whose meaning is
shared by all or nearly all Americans." 0 Insistence on the inclusive nature of
either echoes the insistence of Nineteenth century Protestants that "nonsectar-
ian" Christianity was not essentially Protestant,"' and the parallel assumption of
the 1950s that all Americans could fit under the religious umbrella held up by
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.12
3. Sectarian Meaning
Finally, the Commandments are not just religious or Christian, but also
sectarian. Their symbolic meaning now excludes even many Christians, a pur-
pose betrayed by the consistent choice of the version of the Commandments that
appears in the Kings James Bible instead of the different versions found in the
Catholic Douay and Hebrew Bibles." 3 For example, the King James's prohibi-
tion on the worship of images excludes those who venerate icons, such as Ro-
man Catholics and the Eastern Orthodox.' 14 The official government disap-
108 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 230 (observing that Muslims consider the Bible "a
preliminary, imperfect revelation, unlike God's definitive teaching, found only in the Qur'an");
Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9,
70 (2004) (suggesting that Buddhists, along with atheists and agnostics, resent having to send their
children to public schools that recite a pledge to a nation "under God"). But see Smith, supra note
14, at 8, 21 (suggesting that the proper inquiry should not be whether the words "under God" are
"religious," but whether they are "unnecessarily [and] gratuitously religious").
109 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes, but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 226 (2004)
(arguing that the Pledge is a profession of faith that implies a set of particular religious beliefs,
including that God exists, that there is only one God, and that this God exercises controlling au-
thority over the United States); id. at 226-27 n.458 (noting others who believe that the Pledge
implies that the United States is under God's judgment, that government is limited by God, and
that God is transcendent).
110 See Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1498 (2005). ("For an increasing number of Americans, the Ten Com-
mandments have no religious significance. [W]hile the Ten Commandments speak directly to
Jews, and indirectly to Christians, they have no relevance to the religious life of people who are
not of these faiths.").
III See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
112 See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
113 Professor Finkelman has persuasively demonstrated that even the choice of a version of the
Commandments is sectarian. See Finkelman, supra note 110, at 1480-98. See also Glassroth v.
Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1299 n.3 (11th Cir.) (observing that the different versions of the Com-
mandments reflect "deep theological disputes" (quoting Steven Lubit, The Ten Commandments in
Alabama, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 471, 474 (1998))), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003).
114 E.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH nos. 2129-2132 (John Paul, Bishop ed. 1993),
available at http://www.va/archive/ccc/index.htm (explaining the Catholic Church's interpretation
regarding "graven images"); see Bill Broadway, A New Judgment Day for Decalogue Displays,
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proval of blasphemy, coveting, Sabbath-breaking, and parental disrespect im-
plied by a display of the Commandments is also offensive to many American
Protestants whose faiths condemn such behaviors but also adhere to the reform-
ist Anabaptist precept that government enforcement or encouragement of reli-
gious faith corrupts and cheapens it." 5
But even more than particular theological precepts implicit in any of the
Commandments or in the choice of any of their versions, government display of
the Commandments now signifies a particular normative understanding of the
relationship between church and state in America held by evangelical and other
theologically conservative Protestants. This view holds that the United States is
fundamentally a "Christian" nation (by which is meant an "evangelical" or
"conservative Protestant" nation),1 6 and includes belief that the "Christian"
nation of the United States has a destiny defined by "Christian" beliefs, that the
"Christian" God watches over his "Christian" nation, and thus that recognition
and even worship of this God is essential to preservation of American peace and
prosperity." 7 The evangelical God now defines the God of Judeo-Christianity,
WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2004, at B09 (reporting view of some scholars that the Protestant version of
the Commandments prohibiting worship of images had its origin in Reformation efforts to rid
churches of statues of saints).
115 See WILLIAM R. ESTEP, THE ANABAPTIST STORY 261 (3d ed. 1996) ("The separation of
church and state was viewed as necessary because of the nature of the church. Only thus could the
church be cleansed and freed to be the church under God. The disestablishment of the state
churches was for the Anabaptists the minimum requirement in a guarantee of religious freedom.);
HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 26-27 (recounting the Schleitheim Confession's conclusion "that it
is not appropriate for a Christian to serve as a magistrate").
116 E.g., DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION (1992) (arguing that the founders intended
the United States to be a Christian republic); FRANKY SCHAEFFER, A TIME FOR ANGER: THE MYTH
OF NEUTRALITY (1982) (arguing that the Constitution was constructed from "Christian principles"
and was intended to be "interpreted in the light of the Judeo-Christian tradition"); SOUTHERN
BAPTIST CONVENTION, RESOLUTION ON SECULARIZATION OF OUR CULTURE (2004) (declaring that
"'America was founded upon principles derived from God's Word and expressed in Judeo-
Christian values"; concluding that "America's only hope is a spiritual awakening by the power of
God through the Gospel of Jesus Christ," and calling for "Christians everywhere to aggressively
advance the Kingdom of God"), available at http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/
amResolution.asp?ID=1135; see WALTER H. CAPPS, THE NEW RELIGIOUS RIGHT: PIETY,
PATRIOTISM AND PoLmcs 6 (1990) (describing fundamental tenets of the religious right move-
ment as including the "understanding that the United States of America is a 'Christian nation' in
some literal sense" and the need to "bring religious beliefs and political ideals into mutually sus-
taining alignment," so as to "stabilize the vitality of the nation's common life"); Jacob Heilbrunn,
Neocon v. Theocon, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 1996, at 20, 22 (characterizing the religious right as
a "new Thomist movement" that "embrace[s] explicitly the notion of a Christian nation" and
"accepts the idea of a transcendent divine law that carries universal obligations even for nonbe-
lievers"); see also Heilbrunn, supra, at 24 (reporting Alan Keyes's statement that the founders
understood the Declaration of Independence "to be a bridge between the Bible and the Constitu-
tion, between the basis of our moral faith and the basis of our political life").
117 These are the assumptions that underlaid Rev. Jerry Falwell's and Rev. Pat Robertson's
belief that the 9/11 attacks were the fault of evil and sinful New Yorkers who had turned from
God. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. See also Ledewitz, supra note 56, at 627
("When America is viewed as in a special relationship with God, sin in America cannot simply be
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the personal savior of those who call upon him, the source of American great-
ness who must be thanked and acknowledged as the foundation of our govern-
ment and our society."
8
It is precisely the sectarian Christian meaning associated with "Judeo-
Christian" symbols and practices that triggers such strong conservative Christian
reactions to their removal from public life.' 19 During recent decades, conserva-
tive Christians have successfully projected potent theological meaning onto
these symbols and practices, meaning that has long since overflowed the bounds
of the generically thin Judeo-Christian tradition. 20 Judeo-Christianity has be-
come, in a word, "sectarianized."
C. "Sectarianization'" and the Return of Classic Tolerance
The sectarianization of Judeo-Christianity by conservative Christians
makes it difficult even for some monotheistic believers to see their beliefs re-
flected in its symbols and practices. For example, many conservative Christian
leaders have publicly savaged Islam since 9/11.12 1 Reverend Jerry Falwell has
"stated that Muhammad, the founder of Islam, was a terrorist,"' 122 Reverend Pat
Robertson has referred to Muhammad "as 'a robber and a brigand,"",123 and Rev-
tolerated as something one would expect from pagan non-believers. If America is the Church, sin
must be prohibited by government just as sin is prohibited within the community of faith-within
the Church. For instance, gay marriage cannot just be something that gays do in America that has
nothing really to do with the Church. In this way of thinking, there is no conceptual space for the
sin of non-believers. It generally follows in this perspective that America has an obligation to the
world, much as the Church has the obligation in the New Testament to convert the world and
much as Israel was to be a blessing to the nations.").
118 Cf Marty, supra note 105, at 858-59 (observing that "not a few Jews and other Americans
think that 'Judeo-Christian' is often a code word for those promoting a Christian America").
119 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 1, 7 (2005) (observing that "those who favor the Ten Commandments on
government property ... do so precisely because of the religious content of the Ten Command-
ments and the importance of the Decalogue as a religious symbol"); Shiffrin, supra note 108, at 70
(observing that the "firestorm" of criticism following constitutional invalidation of "under God" in
the Pledge "itself demonstrated the religious character of the message and the tenacity with which
it is held"); Zick, supra note 96, at 2310, 2371-72 (arguing that it was the sacred character of
Moore's decalogue monument in the eyes of some Christian believers that accounted for their
reacting "as if their very faith was under attack" when its removal from the courthouse was threat-
ened).
120 See Massey, supra note 34, at 37-38 (arguing that sectarianization of public religious sym-
bols by conservative Christian majorities was a predictable outcome of the Court's deference to
legislative deployment of such symbols).
121 See UTTER & TRUE, supra note 60, at 29 (observing that since 9/11, "many Christian groups
and publications continued to emphasize the differences between Islam and Christianity and to
proclaim the superiority of the Christian faith" despite widespread media criticism that this ap-
proach was "indicative of a hate-filled campaign of intolerance").
122 Id. at 29.
123 Id.
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erend Franklin Graham, son of well-known evangelist Reverend Billy Graham
and successor to his ministry, has accused American Muslims of endorsing the
9/11 attacks and characterized Islam as an "evil and wicked religion." 124 More
recently, Pope Benedict, in an otherwise sensitive call for rational dialogue on
religiously motivated violence, implied that Islam is "evil and inhuman" be-
cause its Qur'anic command to spread Mohammed's teachings "by the sword"
violated God's nature.1
2 5
Such attacks are not only aimed at Islam but also at other faiths. Rever-
end Falwell has announced that the "Anti-Christ" of the New Testament is Jew-
ish, 126 and comparably vicious attacks by conservative Christians on Catholics,
Mormons, and theological liberals are well-known. 27 Thus, while it is true that
Catholics, Jews, Mormons, and Muslims are all monotheists who accept the
divine origin of the Commandments, the close association of the Command-
ments with hostile sectarian condemnations of their faiths may make it difficult
for the members of these faiths to see themselves and their beliefs reflected in
the symbolic meaning of the decalogue monuments.
During the years he lived in a small city in the deep South, Professor
Gedicks was present for many public prayers offered at community events by
conservative Christian ministers and lay believers. The sentiments expressed in
these prayers, offered up to "God" or "our Father" in the name of Jesus, were
nearly always consistent with his personal religious beliefs. Yet it was also true
that clergy of the conservative Christian churches in the community regularly
warned their members against the dangerous "cult" of the Mormons, to which
124 ESTHER KAPLAN, WITH GOD ON THER SIDE: GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT
82 (2004); UTTER & TRUE, supra note 60, at 29.
125 Pope Benedict XVI, "Lecture of the Holy Father," Aula Magna, University of Regensburg,
Germany (Sept. 12, 2006) (quoting 13th century Byzantine emperor), available at
http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=46474; see also Ian Fisher, Benedict XVI
and the Church That May Shrink Or May Not., N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at WK3 (noting that
Benedict, as Cardinal Ratzinger, oversaw the issuance of a Vatican document which characterized
non-Christian faiths as "deficient").
Even if one considers Benedict's use of this quotation ill-advised, however, the violent
Muslim over-reaction to it seems to have confirmed the quotation's assessment of Islam. This
incident also illustrates the ironic position of Roman Catholics, who can find themselves on both
sides of the sectarianization of Judeo-Christianity, as critics of non-Christian religions like Islam,
and objects of criticism by Protestant conservatives.
126 UTTER & TRUE, supra note 60, at 68.
127 See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 124, at 74 (reporting conservative Christian characterizations
of the Roman Catholic church as the "'church of the Anti-Christ," and The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, or "Mormon" church, as a "'cult"') (quoting Rev. Bob Jones, Jr. & the
Southern Baptist Convention, respectively); UTTER & TRUE, supra note 60, at 71 (reporting that
Rev. Falwell and Rev. Robertson both laid the blame for the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade
Center to abandonment of traditional moral values by feminists, gays and lesbians, and other
cultural liberals who reside in New York City). Professor Gedicks has argued elsewhere that
Latter-day Saints occupy an ironic position in the culture wars similar to that of Roman Catholics,
see supra note 124, as holders of conservative Protestant values whom Protestant conservatives
nevertheless attack as cultists.
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Professor Gedicks belongs. Shorn of its context, this prayer language appeared
open, benign, and ecumenically inclusive. For a person outside the conservative
Christian majority like Professor Gedicks, however, it was impossible to ignore
that this language was usually intended by its speaker and understood by most
of its audience to have a sectarian meaning that did not include him.
Perhaps the best example of how conservative Christians have sectari-
anized the purportedly nondenominational symbols and observances of Judeo-
Christianity is their reaction to former Chief Justice Moore's defiance of a fed-
eral court order to remove his ostentatious decalogue monument from the state
courthouse. Broad and deep conservative Christian support for Moore's insis-
tence on maintaining the display, even in the face of adverse federal and state
judicial decisions, "clearly demonstrate[d] the belief of conservative Christian
groups that the American legal system depends on God-given law and that the
nation must publicly recognize that dependence."'' 28 In the wake of the Moore
controversy and the Decalogue Cases, political conservatives in Congress intro-
duced a jurisdiction-stripping measure that would have prevented federal courts
from reviewing state court decisions upholding governmental acknowledgments
of God irrespective of whether these are tied to America's religious history or
heritage. 29 In introducing this proposed act, one of its co-sponsors criticized
the separation of church and state and declared that the moral condition of the
contemporary United States required the "reintroduction of God" into govern-
ment and public society. 30
Many Americans whose religious beliefs would seem to fall comforta-
bly within the boundaries of Judeo-Christian civil religion are alienated from it
because of the increasingly close association of its symbols and practices with
conservative Christianity.1 3' The conservative Christian understanding of the
128 UTrER & TRUE, supra note 60, at 74-75; accord FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 232 ("[Some]
values evangelicals will not be especially disturbed to discover that some Americans might dis-
agree with the prayers they offer in the workplace or the inspirational message Christian messages
that some teachers in the South hang in their classrooms ... [;] they may even argue that they are
going to promote their beliefs because those beliefs are God's truth, worth fighting for even if the
Constitution limits their public promotion. This tone of civil disobedience was heard among the
supporters of Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore, who were prepared to be arrested rather than to
allow removal of the two-and-a-half ton granite Ten Commandments monument he had erected in
the state courthouse in Montgomery."); KAPLAN, supra note 124, at 247 (observing that members
of Focus on the Family "ranked Moore's fight [to install the Ten Commandments in the Alabama
State Courthouse] as second in importance only to the signing of the partial-birth abortion ban").
129 See Safeguarding our Religious Liberties Act, H.R. 4576, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposed
Dec. 16, 2005); Religious Liberties Restoration Act, S. 1558, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposed Aug.
1,2003).
130 UTTER & TRUE, supra note 60, at 76.
131 Cf Robert J. Bein, Stained Flags: Public Symbols and Equal Protection, 28 SETON HALL L.
REV. 897, 921 (1998) (arguing that the Confederate battle flag cannot act as a unifying symbol of
the South because it excludes southern blacks who have equal claim with whites to the heritage of
the South); Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State Holi-
days, and the Construction of Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1081,
2007]
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
meaning symbolized by Moore's decalogue monument is based on a narrow
theological understanding of the meaning projected by displays of the Com-
mandments to which many Jews, Mormons, Muslims, and even mainline Chris-
tians cannot authentically subscribe. This, of course, is not even to mention
nonbelievers and adherents to non-Western religions and postmodern spiritual-
ity.
Conservative Christians have appropriated the symbols and observances
of Judeo-Christianity with sufficient success that they no longer communicate
theological breadth and inclusiveness, if they ever did. To the contrary, as the
result of this sectarianization, Judeo-Christianity now symbolizes the classic
toleration of non-Christians, marginalized Christians, mainline Christians, and
others outside the bounds of conservative Christianity; that is, nonbelievers,
non-Christians, and heterodox Christians are protected from persecution but not
understood to be true equals in the collective tasks of self-government and in
other dimensions of American public life.132 Since Judeo-Christian symbols and
observances now combine sectarian and patriotic meanings, government de-
ployment of such symbols and observances unavoidably communicates that
conservative Christianity is properly and exclusively in charge of culture and
politics in those communities subject to the deploying government. 133
Sectarianization of Judeo-Christianity has clear doctrinal import. Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine is now largely informed by principles of religious
1100-04 (1995) (arguing that the legitimate Southern honor and pride signified by the Confederate
battle flag cannot be disentangled from the racism it also signifies as a symbol of Southern resis-
tance to abolition, desegregation, and African American civil rights) (discussing James Forman,
Jr., Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE
L.J. 505 (1991)).
132 Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing Conceptions and His-
toric Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUDIES 503, 531 (2006) ('The dominant view among evan-
gelical Christians is that minority religions and nonbelievers should be fully protected from penal-
ties and civil disabilities, with full protection for the free exercise of minority religions. But evan-
gelicals also think that religion should be included in all important government functions, that of
course the religion included will be broadly consistent with the majority's religious beliefs, and
that no one could reasonably expect otherwise. Religious dissenters do not have to attend formal
worship services, but if they want to attend public meetings, or send their children to public
schools, supporters of government prayer say that of course they should have to sit through brief
observances of the majority religion. In that sense, the majority religion would be preferred and
supported by government, and all other religions would be tolerated."); see also Michel
Rosenfeld, Derrida's Ethical Turn and America: Looking Back from the Crossroads of Global
Terrorism and the Enlightenment, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 815, 828 (2005) (describing Derrida's
view that tolerance is a "Catholic virtue," historically rooted in the medieval church's self-
confident forbearance towards those "living in error," and thus not "a relationship among equals,
but rather a concession by the powerful to the powerless, and one that is subject to change or
revocation at will").
133 See KARST, supra note 54, at 149.
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equality and government neutrality. 34 These principles generally prevent fed-
eral and state governments in the United States from acting or speaking as if a
particular religion, or even belief generally, were metaphysically true or morally
correct. 35 Government use of sectarianized symbols and observances of con-
servative Judeo-Christianity would undermine, and could eventually eliminate,
these doctrinal ethics of equality and neutrality. In that event, government
would be re-empowered to define religious truth in accordance with the sectar-
ian preferences of the majority, and religious minorities would have to endure
the social marginalization that accompanies adherence to a tradition of belief or
unbelief that falls outside the boundaries of the majority's version of Christian-
ity. 136
The threat of majoritarianism to religious equality and government neu-
trality is perfectly captured in Justice Scalia's bald declaration that the over-
whelming preference of American believers for monotheism justifies both gov-
ernmental endorsement of monotheism and its corresponding disapproval of
polytheism and other nonmonotheistic belief systems. 137 Even setting aside that
Justice Scalia has ignored both nonbelievers and nonmonotheistic believers,
138
his argument proves too much. If the fact that 97% of American believers are
monotheists suffices to immunize government displays of the Commandments
from Establishment Clause attack, then the fact that nearly as many American
believers are Christians would similarly suffice to insulate government en-
dorsements of Christianity itself, as in, say, government declarations that "Jesus
134 Dan Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to For-
mal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to
Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002).
135 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 108-09 (2002).
136 See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note I1, at 222 ("[E]ven in the face of diversity, allowing citizens
to use the government to express or give effect to religious belief enables some to exclude or
disadvantage those who believe differently .... If the state is functionally Christian, how can
Jews or Muslims be equal to Christians as citizens?"); Hall, supra note 95, at 80-81 (arguing that
civil or "civic" religion "may force religious minorities to sever civil communion to avoid spiri-
tual pollution," may cause separationists to forego "participation in civic occasions such as school
graduation ceremonies to avoid contamination with prayers that create in their minds an unholy
communion," and "will coerce citizens to deny their citizenship rather than submit to an unholy
spiritual fellowship"); Massey, supra note 34, at 49 (arguing that the Court's Religion Clause
doctrine of legislative deference may encourage government coercion by majorities "who seek to
push the judicial boundaries of establishment further to the margins, particularly when the issue
involves the degree to which religious ceremony should play a part in public culture"); Shiffrin,
supra note 108, at 39 ("If a state is permitted to endorse a particular religion, formally creating
insiders and outsiders on the basis of religion, there is good reason to fear that this formal margin-
alization will carry over to the social and economic spheres. Discriminating on the basis of relig-
ion would be subtly encouraged.").
137 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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Christ [is] our Lord and Savior."'139 One hopes that not even Justice Scalia
would go so far.
In sum, at the same time that religious demographics in the United
States have placed large numbers of Americans outside the boundaries of Judeo-
Christian civil religion, the sectarianization of Judeo-Christianity has shrunk the
theological landscape marked by these boundaries, making it doubly unlikely
that Judeo-Christianity can function as the social and political unifier that civil
religion is supposed to be.
V. CONCLUSION: THE PAST THAT Is No LONGER PRESENT
There is an unmistakable nostalgia attached to conservative Christian
efforts to reclaim the symbols of Judeo-Christian civil religion. These symbols
are being used to recall American society to the 1950s, when Judeo-Christianity
formed the foundation for the "religious people" of the United States, 140 if not to
the 1890s, when "nonsectarian" Christianity formed the foundation of a "Chris-
tian nation."' 141 The sectarianization of Judeo-Christianity exhibits one of the
signal attributes of religious fundamentalism: recourse to the past in reaction to
uncertainties and upheavals triggered by contemporary life.142 Fundamentalism
looks back to an idyllic time when traditional religious values are thought to
have underwritten a social order and stability that economic, political, and cul-
tural liberalization have undermined and surpassed.143
But this older order cannot be restored. Liberal democracy seeking to
establish or maintain itself in a social condition of religious pluralism does not
flourish when infused with thick religious values. 144 In such conditions, liberal
139 See Jack Balkin, Justice Scalia Puts His Cards on the Table, BALKINIZATION, June 27, 2005,
available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/06/justice-scalia-puts-his-cards-on-table.html
("[Wihy did Jews and Muslims get thrown in the mix of first class religious citizens? After all, if
you exclude them you still have about 91% of the population. So why couldn't the government
offer prayers to Jesus Christ, our Lord and Savior? Why couldn't we say that 'Invocation of [a
Christian] God despite ... the beliefs [of non-Christians] is permitted not because [non-Christian]
religions cease to be religions recognized by the religion clauses of the First Amendment, but
because governmental invocation of [Christ] is not an establishment."') (quoting and interlineat-
ing McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 899-900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
140 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
141 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,471 (1892).
142 Gedicks, supra note 63, at 1222; see Martin E. Marty, The Widening Gyres of Religion and
Law, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 660 (1996) ("It is often presumed, at least by the more nostalgic
souls, that at certain moments-e.g., for the West, in medieval Christendom or, for America, in
certain colonial situations of religious establishment-there was coherence because the legal
sphere was coextensive with the religious.").
143 See RICHARD D. BROWN, MODERNIZATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIFE 1600-
1865, at 59, 98 (1976).
144 This is, of course, the Rawlsian argument. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 448
(1971) ("In a well-ordered society, then, the plans of life of individuals are different in the sense
that these plans give prominence to different aims, and persons are left free to determine their
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democracy depends on the development of thin, procedural values, which per-
mit individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good so long as they do
not interfere with that pursuit by others.145  No set of values is sufficiently
broad, and no civil religion sufficiently inclusive, to shelter all or nearly all of
the citizens of a religiously plural country. 46 To the contrary, linking patriotism
and citizenship to civil religion in circumstances of religious pluralism will in-
evitably result in alienation of those portions of the population who cannot see
themselves in the model citizen presupposed by the civil religion.
147
The linkage of Judeo-Christianity to American politics and government
only makes sense in a world that has already passed away. Civil religion was
supposed to provide a substitute for the established church, a means of morally
instructing and spiritually unifying the people so as to bind them to republican
government. The irony of civil religion is that its invocation triggers the very
disunity it was supposed to remedy. At the very time that religious pluralism
has strained the ability of Judeo-Christianity to function as a plausibly national
civil religion, conservative Christians have sectarianized the public meaning of
Judeo-Christianity, thereby shrinking its inclusive possibilities even further.
Even in its most latitudinarian mode, Judeo-Christianity alienates from their
country ever larger minorities of unbelief, non-Western religion, and postmod-
ern spirituality. At the same time, the efforts of conservative Christians to recall
the sectarian meaning of Judeo-Christianity ensure that it will become increas-
ingly sectarian, not latitudinarian. This improbable means of pursuing patriotic
loyalty and national unity in the United States ought to be abandoned.
good, the views of others being counted as merely advisory."); accord Walzer, supra note 6, at
622 ("[Ilt is very important that people whose views have had a religious formation learn to politi-
cize them. They don't need to leave them behind when they enter the political arena, but they do
need to surrender their absolutism.").
145 See RAWLS, supra note 144, at 396 (arguing for the general priority of rights over the good
in a well-ordered society, and for a "thin theory" of the good which assures each member of soci-
ety "equal liberty to pursue whatever plan of life he pleases as long as it does not violate what
justice demands"); see also Walzer, supra note 6, at 633 (arguing that liberal democratic societies
can actively seek to realize "this or that idea of the good society. What follows is simply that, so
long as there are different ideas, no realization can be definitive. On the religious or ideological
side of the line, the good society can have an absolute form; on the political side, it is always
provisional").
146 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 38 (1993) ("Since there is no reasonable religious,
philosophical, or moral doctrine affirmed by all citizens, the conception of justice affirmed by all
citizens in a well-ordered democratic society must be a conception limited to what I shall call 'the
domain of the political' and its values. [C]itizens individually decide for themselves in what way
the public political conception all affirm is related to their own more comprehensive views.").
147 Cf Bein, supra note 131, at 913 (arguing that for public symbols to function as a means of
uniting citizens with their country, they "must advance a message that speaks inclusively to the
citizenry. If a symbol represents a message of exclusion, rather than inclusion, it will deny those
excluded full participation in public life ... [leaving] them with a sense of physical vulnerability,
alienation, and displacement.").
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